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Abstract
We analyze how the sparsity of a typical aggregate social
relation impacts the network overhead of online commu-
nication systems designed to provide k-anonymity. Once
users are grouped in anonymity sets there will likely be
few related pairs of users between any two particular sets,
and so the sets need to be large in order to provide cover
traffic between them. We can reduce the associated over-
head by having both parties in a communication specify
both the origin and the target sets of the communication.
We propose to call this communication primitive “sym-
metric disclosure.” If in order to retrieve messages a user
specifies a group from which he expects to receive them,
the negative impact of the sparsity is offset.
1 Introduction
In the quest to build Internet communication systems that
preserve the privacy of their users, many promising ap-
proaches have been proposed. Onion Routing remains
the most popular and practical paradigm, and with good
reason. Yet creating a solution that would compete with
the most popular online services on efficiency while also
providing provable privacy and security is still a chal-
lenge. Making users indistinguishable within certain
groups, known as k-anonymity, would deliver strong pro-
tection against powerful adversaries [1], but it presents
an array of practical hurdles. Many of those hurdles have
been minimized in relevant research.
Herbivore [2] is a k-anonymity based system that can
serve as a point of reference in this discussion. By di-
viding users into smaller groups, Herbivore manages to
reduce resource overhead significantly. We will build on
and expand this discussion. Both Herbivore and, more
recently, Dissent [3, 4, 5] use DC-nets to make sure that
their anonymity sets are reliable. They mark admirable
progress in making sure the architectures scale. Aqua
[6] is another recent model, which groups clients that
exhibit similar behavior to achieve k-anonymity. Aqua
maintains these anonymity sets by using mixes, and has
a weaker threat model than Herbivore and Dissent, but
limits the bandwidth overhead. The strategy we propose
in this paper could be implemented straightforwardly in
a scheme such as Aqua.
We think of a social network or large communica-
tion system as a graph where nodes correspond to the
users, and edges to a social relationship such as Face-
book’s “friendship.” We model a communication be-
tween users as traveling over an edge, from a user to one
of his friends and call all communications “messages.”
We then group users into m anonymity sets, by assign-
ing each user to a set uniformly at random. These sets
will have close to n/m users, and will be extremely un-
likely to have significantly less users, so we can pick
k = n/2m. This grouping conceals the social graph from
the service provider, and if methods of existing power-
ful k-anonymity schemes [2, 4, 6] are employed, from
powerful global adversaries.
This paper sets out to discuss group sizes and resource
trade-offs for k-anonymity systems. As a point of depar-
ture, we look at the amount of traffic between two ran-
domly chosen groups. Since a typical social relation is
sparse, this amount is small relative to the size of the
groups. For any connection between two groups, any
other connection between the same groups can serve to
provide cover traffic to hide communication patterns on
that particular connection. As the amount of expected
connections grows, so do the sizes of the groups. In fact
in the case of Facebook there would need to be on the or-
der of thousands of users in each group in order for us to
have a reasonable expectation of having any cover traffic
at all. In a setting where messages meant for each mem-
ber are broadcast to the entire group, this would mean
that we need to accept high bandwidth overhead in order
to gain cover traffic. We argue that if each member of
a group only retrieves communications from a group in
which he has a friend, no information about the social
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graph is compromised.
Different services may require different amounts of
cover traffic, and therefore different group sizes. We di-
vide our discussion into consequences of opting for little
resource premiums (light design), and for a high prob-
ability of achieving a specific amount of cover traffic
(stream design). We then borrow some intuition from
differential privacy to argue that perhaps a middle of the
road design that we call hybrid strikes a good balance.
The aim of the hybrid design is to make the groups just
big enough to be likely to provide some cover traffic.
We open with an intuitive introduction in Section 2.
We start by describing the general idea of a k-anonymous
system with multicast, and then argue for discriminating
between messages based on their source group. Section
3 provides some relevant formal definitions. In Section
4, we estimate desired sizes of the groups based on the
social graph of Facebook. Section 5 looks at real-world
practicality and resource use, and Section 6 suggests a di-
rection that could further reduce the resource premiums.
We present our conclusions in Section 7.
2 Key idea
Let us start by painting an intuitive picture of what we are
trying to do. For the purposes of a theoretical model, we
envision a centralized communication service. The same
structure, however, could be implemented in a decentral-
ized way. Our goal is to allow the users to communicate
while concealing the structure of the social graph.
First, a user signs up for the service and gets assigned
to a group uniformly at random. Unlike in Aqua [6],
no individual properties of the users are a factor in the
group assignment. It’s worth noting that Herbivore [2]
uses an assignment protocol that attempts to keep groups
approximately evenly sized while also taking the deci-
sion out of the users’ hands. We have the same goals,
but choose to simplify the protocol for the sake of this
theoretical model by keeping the number of groups fixed
and assigning each user to a group uniformly at random
(and in particular not according to local properties or re-
lationships on the social graph). At this point the user’s
identity is not hidden.
Suppose that from then on, a user is reliably hidden
within his group. In practice, this might mean that the
users interact with the service on their own as a part of
a DC-net or through a system of mixes. The latter could
be either Aqua’s architecture that assumes entry and exit
mixes are not compromised, or we could suppose the
users connect to the system through Tor and we choose to
disregard potential de-anonymizing attacks for the pur-
poses of this paper. In both cases, the users maintain
k− 1 anonymity with respect to other members of their
group. The computational requirements of authenticat-
ing in a way that would keep a user anonymous within
their group are tractable, as there has been remarkable
progress in the field of anonymous authentication tech-
niques such as linkable ring signatures [7, 8]. They re-
quire constant time computation and allow the system to
revoke misbehaving users [9].
In order to send a message, a user will first encrypt it
with the intended recipient’s individual public key, and
then enter it to the system as a message addressed to the
recipient’s group. So if Alice is in group A and Bob is in
group B, and Alice wishes to send a message to Bob, she
encrypts it with Bob’s public key, and tells the service “I
am a member of group A and this is a message for group
B.” The source and destination group of the message
will be known, so we can view the message as equipped
with a pair (A,B) as a message header. So far, we’re
describing a familiar idea of a k-anonymous system with
multicast.
For Alice to find out Bob’s group and key, either a sep-
arate system could be in place for establishing the friend-
ship relation as in Pond [11], or we could use a public
address book such as Cryptobook [12].
A typical social relation is sparse. A social network
can have hundreds of millions of users and each will only
have a few hundred friends. Unless the groups we put
users in are big, if Alice and Bob are friends they are
likely to be the only connection between their groups.
Suppose that Alice sends a message to Bob. What she
reveals is that there is a connection between her group
and Bob’s. Bob knows he has a friend in Alice’s group.
If, instead of retrieving all messages that is meant for his
group he only retrieves “messages for group B that orig-
inated in group A,” he’s not revealing extra information
about the social graph - the connection between groups A
and B has already been revealed by Alice. And thanks to
the sparsity, he’s unlikely to have to download any mes-
sages that are not meant for him, as if Bob’s group had a
separate post box for each sender group.
Figure 1: Bob only opens the post box with messages
that arrived from Alice’s group. Illustration c© Eleri Mai Harris 2014
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This change could help cut down on broadband in a
system that employs mixes, such as Aqua [6]. Aqua
was designed to anonymize BitTorrent traffic, its primary
role is to facilitate download. In this type of an archi-
tecture, Bob can specifically request the messages meant
for group B, originating in group A. As long as Bob’s re-
quests for messages from separate groups can’t be linked,
he doesn’t need to employ a PIR scheme and the social
graph will remain obscured. We come back to the ques-
tion of unlinkability in Section 5.
Discriminating between messages based on source
group may not cut down on bandwidth in systems that
employ DC-nets, since they require all communications
to be broadcast to the entire group as part of their func-
tioning. In such case the most obvious strategy of broad-
casting every message to all member exactly once re-
mains optimal. However, our discussion is valid for the
purposes of computation cost - Bob can discard messages
that come from groups he has no friends in without try-
ing to decrypt them. In this case, the estimates in Section
4 remain valid.
This is what we refer to as symmetric disclosure: the
fact that a message exists already reveals the fact that
there is a connection between groups A and B. Surely,
the person it is meant for is one of the members of group
B that do in fact have a friend in group A, and so Bob dis-
closed information that had already been revealed by Al-
ice. A standard multicast method would have Bob deal-
ing with every message addressed for his group. If there
are m groups, Bob would need to sieve through on aver-
age one in m messages sent in the entire network. But
once we shift focus to pairs of groups, such as (A,B),
this is on the order of 1/m2 for each of Bob’s friends.
The trade-off is that if we use this fact to save on broad-
band, the adversary learns a more narrow set of possible
pickup times for the message.
For k-anonymity, the sparsity of a social relation
seems like a problem - even in a k-anonymous setting,
it might be easy to distinguish the traffic between a spe-
cific pair of users that are known to be friends. Symmet-
ric disclosure is an attempt to neutralize the cost of this
sparsity. If used to its full potential, we need only give up
as much bandwidth as much cover traffic we are trying
to gain, and can set the group sizes accordingly.
2.1 Threat model
On its own, the presented scheme is designed to do well
against a passive observer with the capabilities of a ser-
vice provider, or as an anonymized dataset. With ev-
ery encrypted communication between two users, the ad-
versary learns the source group, send time, destination
group, and a set of potential pickup times as well as the
size of the communication.
However, the same discussion applies to powerful k-
anonymity systems [2, 4, 6] that would allow us to as-
sume the users are reliably hidden within their groups,
and in particular in Aqua [6] symmetric disclosure could
be easily implemented. In such a case we will assume
the threat model of Aqua: an adversary that is also ca-
pable of global traffic analysis, taking over parts of the
system’s infrastructure, and modifying communications.
The Aqua threat model also allows for a bounded number
of compromised clients. We could rely on the revocation
capabilities of the login protocols to prevent such attacks,
but we do not discuss it in this paper. Any adversary is
computationally bounded in a way that allows for use of
public key encryption.
3 Theoretical setup
Now that we have an intuitive idea of what we are trying
to achieve, let’s put it on a formal footing. We define a
communication network as a set of users equipped with
a friendship relation, and content traveling from one user
to another. For simplicity, call all content messages and
assume that these messages are evenly sized.
Definition Let a communication network G= (V,E,M)
consist of the set of n usersV , a friendship relation E be-
tween the users and the set of messages M. If a, b ∈ V ,
a message m ∈ M, from a to b is defined by quintuple
(a, b, t, t ′, cb) where t is the time the message is sent,
t ′ is the time the message is received and cb is the mes-
sage’s content encrypted for b.
We model the underlying social graph (V,E) the usual
way, with the nodes in the graph representing the users,
and Alice and Bob connected by an edge if and only if
they are friends in this network. We will partition the
set of nodes V it into m parts, where m is a parameter to
be determined based on anonymity preferences. We do
this by allocating each of the n users to one of the groups
{V1,V2, . . . ,Vm} uniformly at random. These groups will
serve as stable anonymity sets for the users.
We arrive at a projection operator Pm : G→ G , that
sorts the users into equivalence classes {V1,V2, . . . ,Vm},
and projects the friendship relation E to a relation E be-
tween the sets {V1,V2, . . . ,Vm} defined by {Vi,Vj} ∈ E if
and only if {x,y} ∈ E for some x ∈Vi and y ∈Vj.
Suppose that there is a message traveling from a ∈VA
to b ∈ VB. From the point of view of the service, a user
declared themselves to be a member of group VA wishing
to send a message to group VB, then one or more users
declared themselves to each be a member of group VB
wishing to download messages incoming from group VA.
Under the action of Pm, µ = (a, b, t, t ′, cb) ∈ M
becomesPm(µ) = (VA, VB, t, T ′V j , cVB) ∈M whereVA
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and VB contain a and b respectively, and where T ′VB ={t ′1, t ′2, . . . , t ′|VB|} is the set of (unassigned) times at which
the messagePm(µ) is received by members ofVB. Most
of the entries will be empty, as most members of VB will
never receive the message.
Definition Let a projection network G = (V ,E ,M )
consist of the set V of m user equivalence classes,
{V2,V2, . . . ,Vm}, a relation E between the sets and the
set of messagesM .
P4
−→
Figure 2: The action of projection operator on a graph.
One might argue that a standard multicast model al-
lows for a bigger set of possible pickup times of a par-
ticular message. But as in all cases where the receiver
is hidden by a stronger mechanism than a sender, such
advantage is voided in back-and-forth correspondence.
4 Group sizes
If Alice and Bob are the only connection between their
groups, they won’t use any more bandwidth or compu-
tational power to communicate than if they were using
an encrypted communication network without a projec-
tion. But this still allows for pattern analysis - say, if
an adversary has auxiliary information that suggests that
Alice and Bob’s communications are of interest, he can
find valuable information.
In some settings this could be considered a feature.
If two specific people are of interest to a law enforce-
ment agency and known to be likely to communicate,
with small enough groups their apparent traffic can be
analyzed, however circumstantial. The good news is that
both parties need to be of interest in the first place - sim-
ply communicating with someone who is of interest will
not put a user under suspicion. Likewise, allowing for
analysis of such anonymized patterns could work well in
certain research settings.
We can therefore choose to set the number of groups
to be large enough that Alice and Bob are likely to be
the only pair of friends between their respective groups
in the projection network, or alternatively, small enough
so that there are likely to be other people communicating
between these two groups. The first design is efficient,
while the second has a chance of protecting the users
from traffic analysis - the choice would depend on the
intended nature of the service. We divide our discussion
into the following two settings:
Light design: There are sufficiently many groups so
that a connection between groups is likely to be unique.
If an adversary has no information other than the data
in the network that suggests that Alice might be the one
sending messages to Bob’s group, she will be hidden in
a powerful anonymity set at little cost. In section 4.1 we
find that if we applied this division to Facebook’s social
graph the anonymity sets could be of average size about
916 users and only 20% of messages would be down-
loaded more than once.
Stream design: In this case, we adjust the number of
groups so that there are few pairs of groups that have less
that l connections between them.
Hybrid design This is the stream design with l = 1.
We can approximate the number of edges between
groups by a Poisson distribution. Suppose we decide that
a particular minimum l should be attained with probabil-
ity 1− ε . If the network has millions of users, we expect
this to result in several thousand of users in each group.
We are effectively constructing anonymity sets for con-
nections. Let us call the combined connections between
two groups VA and VB the stream between VA and VB.
Depending on the context, we can choose how much ef-
ficiency we are willing to give up to ensure that an edge
has a stronger anonymity set.
4.1 Estimating group sizes based on Face-
book’s social graph
The schemes we just identified point to a desired proba-
bility distribution of the number of connections between
a pair of groups chosen uniformly at random. We now
set out to estimate the sizes of anonymity sets that these
might yield in a large social graph. For our evaluation
we will approximate the degree distribution of the Face-
book social graph as described by Ugander et al. [13],
and the accompanying dataset [14]. It is worth noting
that since users are assigned to groups uniformly at ran-
dom, we do not need to consider clustering properties of
the friendship relation, only the distribution of degrees of
particular nodes. The mean degree is d = 191.4161, with
standard deviation σ = 190.4263, and n= 721094633.
In order to gauge the group sizes in light and hybrid
designs, we would like to estimate the probability that
Alice and Bob, while corresponding, will have to deal
with messages other than their own. In the light design,
we would like to minimize this probability. In the hybrid
4
design, we would like to maximize it while still keep-
ing the mean number of connections between two groups
low for the sake of efficiency.
The probability that Alice and Bob, while correspond-
ing, will have to deal with messages other than their own
is the probability that while the two of them are con-
nected with an edge in G, there is another edge between
VA andVB. Due to the sparsity of the friendship relation in
the graph, the probability of any particular edge existing
is negligible (on the order of d/n). So after we remove
the edge {Alice, Bob}, the probability that VA andVB are
connected is equivalent to the probability that, if a pair
of groups is picked uniformly at random, there exists an
edge between these groups.
For any given groups Vi and Vj, we estimate the prob-
ability that there exist no edges between them. Even
though the degree structure is preserved in the model, on
the relevant values of m this can be well approximated by
a Poisson random variable with parameter ndm2 that cor-
responds to distributing edges between pairs of groups.
(The total number of edges is nd/2, the total number of
pairs with repetition (we allow edges with both ends in
the same group) is m2/2.) We will present a more thor-
ough evaluation below, but we find that the two distribu-
tions agree numerically for all typical values of m.
We can describe the number of users in a group with
a binomial distribution with mean n/m. This can be well
approximated by a normal random variable with mean
n/m and standard deviation
√
n/m.
Suppose that we are looking at a group Vi, with |Vi|
nodes. We can use the Central Limit Theorem to ap-
proximate the distribution of the sum of node degrees in
a particular group Vi as normal distribution with mean
d×|Vi| and variance σ2×|Vi|.
We can conclude that for a groupVi the probability that
it has j members and the sum of their degrees is D can
be described byN ( j; nm ,
√ n
m )×N (D; jd,
√
jσ). Every
edge with one end in Vi has chance 1m of its other end
being in Vj, so the event that none of these land in Vj
hes probability (1− 1m )D. Then the probability ε that for
randomly picked Vi, Vj we have {Vi,Vj} /∈ E is:
P[{Vi,Vj} /∈ E ]'
∫
R+×R+
dx d j
(
1− 1
m
)x
×N ( j; n
m
,
√
n
m
)×N (x; jd,
√
jσ) .
(1)
The graph in Figure 3 plots the probability 1−ε that a pir
of groups picked uniformly at random is connected, with
respect to parameter m. The numerical values for the cor-
responding Poisson distribution in the drop off region are
in excellent agreement with ones obtained in this way.
We find from Table 1 that for group sizes of n/m∼ 916
only about 20% of connections are not unique, and for
n/m∼ 194 this becomes about 1%. The values at the top
of Table 1 correspond to the hybrid design, while those
at the bottom correspond to the light design.
Figure 3: The probability 1− ε that two groups are con-
nected.
Thanks to the properties of the Poisson distribution,
we can evaluate group sizes in the stream design in much
the same fashion, and the probability that two groups are
connected by at least l << m edges will yield the same
variance.
Table 1: Value of m and group size n/m for various 1−ε
1− ε m mean mean #
group size connections
0.999 ∼141,360 ∼5100 6.9077
0.995 ∼161408 ∼4467 5.2963
0.99 ∼173,125 ∼4165 4.6052
0.9 ∼244,837 ∼2945 2.3026
0.8 ∼292,852 ∼2462 1.6094
0.75 ∼315,542 ∼2285 1.4863
0.2 ∼786,490 ∼916 0.2231
0.1 ∼1,144,580 ∼630 0.1054
0.01 ∼3,705,910 ∼194 0.0101
4.2 Edge privacy of E
Let us provide an additional bit of intuition than might
guide a choice of target amount of traffic. Suppose that
Alice sends a message to Bob, but the adversary doesn’t
know that Alice is a person of interest. What she dis-
closes to the network is that there is a connection be-
tween group VA - her group, and group VB - Bob’s group
i.e. that {VA,VB} ∈ E . We would like this information to
be statistically meaningless.
For example, suppose that Alice an Bob are friends
and that 1− ε = 0.99. An adversary obtains the graph of
G = (V ,E ), i.e. a projection network of the system. The
probability that if we remove Alice from the dataset it
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will still be the case that {VA,VB} ∈ E is 0.99.
We will use the following definition of edge-privacy:
Definition Suppose that Alice is in group VA and Bob is
in groupVB and {Alice, Bob} ∈ E. The model is ε-edge-
private for Alice sending a message to Bob if there exist
an edge between VA−{Alice} and VB with probability at
least 1− ε.
This definition is not symmetric. In the spirit of differ-
ential privacy, we are examining the chances of getting
{VA,VB} ∈ E in the projection network G after changing
the information of a single agent, Alice. 1−ε is the prob-
ability that Alice and Bob are downloading extra mes-
sages when retrieving messages from each other. The
hybrid design was the one where we tried to maximize
this probability while keeping the mean number of con-
nections low. We might therefore argue that if building a
k-anonymity based system one might consider aiming at
groups that are just big enough to preserve edge-privacy.
4.3 Traffic analysis and group reassign-
ment
Hopper and Vasserman [16] analyzed the resistance of
k-anonymity to global traffic analysis and concluded that
if the groups change rarely, statistical disclosure attacks
will fail. They point out that this is problematic in prac-
tice - in a practical system, groups are likely to fluctuate
according to users’ behavior. They quantify the accept-
able churn of the network. Applying their formula to
what we called a hybrid design for the Facebook statis-
tics, we can accommodate on the order of 104 group
changes, with an additional factor depending on the de-
sired confidence parameter.
We have not considered the growth of the network, but
instead looked at a stable social graph with n nodes. Lo-
cally, the we can handle the growth of the graph by sim-
ply assigning a new user to one of m pre-existing groups
as she joins the network.
In the long run the number of sets m needs to be up-
dated as the network grows, if we are hoping to keep the
target density in the projection network. At this point the
users need to be assigned to groups again uniformly at
random, or groups could be split into smaller ones as it
is done in Herbivore [2]. Small networks are more dense
since the user base tends to be less diverse. The number
of sets we need will grow slower than the network.
5 Bob’s query quandary
It is important that Bob’s requests for messages from sep-
arate groups can not be correlated and linked. This corre-
lation would allow an adversary to fingerprint Bob, and
over time collect such lists for most users, thus recover-
ing much of the graph structure.
In a decentralized system using mixes, Bob would
most likely receive his mail from each group over a sepa-
rate mix path. We must take care that that these requests
are not correlated based on timing. In a centralized set-
ting, this danger is even higher. Suppose then that Bob
disguises his IP address separately for the purposes of
each group he needs to request messages from. Sup-
pose that Bob has friends in dB groups. A conserva-
tive strategy of connecting at random times and check-
ing a random friend group each time would result in
Θ(dB log(dB)) checks as in the coupon collector’s prob-
lem.
If Bob prefers connecting only once, he could check
all messages meant for his group. He can then discard
whatever he knows is not of interest. Even if the archi-
tecture of the system allows for symmetric disclosure, it
may not be a preferable strategy in small, comparably
dense networks. We will call the one connection sce-
nario the bulk download (BD) option for each scheme,
and include if for comparison.
There are three types of resource use that Bob is con-
cerned with:
• Bandwidth use, measured in the ratio of the messages Bob
is likely to download over ones actually meant for him.
• Computational power, in decryption attempts Bob has to
perform over the number of messages meant for him.
• Time, measured in the number of connections he needs to
make to the service to check all of his messages.
In the light design, as long as Bob checks his messages
from one friend group at a time, there are negligible pre-
miums on bandwidth and computation. Similarly, in the
hybrid design these premiums are small enough factors
that they could be handled by a personal computer with-
out impact.
Table 2 compares the resource use in these scenar-
ios. For the sake of computational efficiency and as
an anti-spam measure, assume that only a small part
of a message needs to be downloaded and analyzed for
Bob to determine whether the message is meant for him.
This could be done with a small encrypted header, that
would then serve as an implicit address and include a
designated-verifier digital signature [10] so that Bob can
be sure that the message is not only meant for him, but
comes from Alice. In the table, we assume that the hea-
dem measures ϕ of a message size. We don’t consider
PIR protocols, but they could be useful in medium-sized
networks.
Let dB be the number of groups Bob has friends in, ϕ
the ratio of the size of the identifying appendix to mes-
sage size, and µε mean number of connections between
two groups in hybrid and stream design. In hybrid, a pos-
sible value of µε might be about 5 or 7 for an ε of 0.005
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or 0.001, as evidenced in Table 1. Unless the distribution
of node degrees in the graph is highly anomalous, this
number depends only on the variance of Poisson distri-
bution, rather than size or density of the graph itself.
Table 2: Approximate resource use
Scheme Light Stream/ BD
Hybrid
Bandwidth 1 µε (1+ϕ) |VB|(1+ϕ)
Computation 1 1+ϕµε as non-BD
# connections Θ(dB log(dB)) Θ(dB log(dB)) 1
6 A possible improvement
The number of connections that Bob has to make to
check all of his messages could prove to be a time issue.
Let us explore what one can do to minimize it.
So let us again look at a situation in which Alice is in
groupVA and Bob is in groupVB. If another user, Charlie,
retrieves messages that go from Alice’s to Bob’s group,
no harm is done to Alice or Bob. All the addressing that
is specific to Bob is implicit and so won’t be visible to
Charlie, he might even provide a useful decoy.
As Alice writes to Bob, she could append as part of
the content of her message that the next message will
be sent to VY . Bob will retrieve it as sent from VA to
VY . Later, Alice may change her strategy. This alone can
serve to conceal the patterns in Bob’s retrieval requests.
If the sender groups could also be made dynamic in this
way, we could all but eliminate the resource premiums.
It could prove to be an interesting quandary to explore
what kind of a protocol minimizes the number of sender
groups Bob needs to retrieve messages from.
7 Conclusions
While some efficiency concerns remain, in particular
with respect to the number of separate queries each user
has to make, we believe that this approach has merits.
Building a provably anonymous communication system
is an important problem and k-anonymity might be the
most promising take on it so far. Symmetric disclosure
is step in bringing it to the realm of feasibility. This idea
promises, in its light form, a practical proposal to limit
useful information obtained from large communication
datasets to communication patterns of pairs of people
that are known to communicate due to auxiliary infor-
mation. It also provides a good way to obtain research
datasets of communications without exposing the par-
ties in any particular communication. In its hybrid and
stream form, symmetric disclosure hides the communi-
cation patterns in anonymity sets of their own.
In both cases, it sets out to limit the network overhead
to the amount of cover traffic that would be obtained and
no more.
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